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CHAPTER 7 
Commercial Law 
ALFRED I. MALESON 
§7.1. Consumer credit: Credit card purchases. Distinctions must 
often be drawn, for a variety of reasons, between debts arising from 
the borrowing of money and those arising from the purchase of goods 
or services on a deferred payment plan. For example, in jurisdictions 
having general usury laws, it is necessary to decide whether the 
"finance" or "service" charges are subject to the limitations imposed 
on interest, or whether they are simply a part of the price which may 
be negotiated by the buyer and seller without this control. The same 
determination must be made within the framework of income tax laws, 
which may permit deductions for interest on loans, but not for any 
part of the price paid for consumer goods or services. It is not surpris-
ing that the answer to the question may be different when the reason 
for asking the question is different. 
A reason for asking the question in this Commonwealth is to deter-
mine whether the creditor must be licensed by the Commissioner of 
Banks on the ground that he is in the business of, making loans of 
three thousand dollars or less with interest in excess of twelve per cent 
per year.1 While the seller himself has never been held to be in the 
business of making loans simply because his sales are on credit, it was 
formerly the opinion of the courts, as shown by a decision published 
in 1940, that if the buyer's payments were made to a finance company 
which had purchased the buyer's notes from the seller in accordance 
with a prearranged plan of financing, then the finance company was 
in the business of making loans.2 
This decision met with legislative disapproval, however, for in 1941 
the licensing statute was amended to exempt from the concept of 
being in the business of making small loans "any transaction which 
involves any note or other instrument evidencing the indebtedness 
of a buyer to the seller of goods, services or insurance for a part or 
all of the purchase price."s 
During the 1965 SURVEY year, a new type of prearranged financing 
scheme was matched against the licensing requirement. In Uni-Serv 
Corp. of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Banks,4 the financing plan 
involved the use of a credit card obtained by applicants who would 
ALFRED I. MALESON is Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law School. 
§7.I. 1 License is required by G.L., c. 140, §96. 
2 Modem Finance Co. v. Holz. 307 Mass. 281. 29 N.E.2d 922 (1940). 
8 G.L., c. 140, §96, as amended by Acts of 1941, c. 158, §I. 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 875.207 N.E.2d 887. 
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then make credit purchases at any stores participating in the plan. 
Nothing was added to the price of the goods purchased in any indi-
vidual sale. The credit card company purchased from the member 
stores the sales slips evidencing the indebtedness of the buyer, and 
the buyer received monthly bills from the credit card company. The 
buyer's minimum monthly obligation depended upon the total 
monthly balance, regardless of the number or sizes of the individual 
purchases. Beyond his minimum monthly obligation, the buyer could 
pay as much of his balance as he wished. 
To any balance remaining twenty days after each billing date, a 
"service charge" of one or one and one-half per cent was added. The 
Commissioner of Banks took the understandable position that this 
amounted to the business of making loans, not simply financing time 
sales. The Supreme Judicial Court held, however, that since the cus-
tomer could use his credit only when purchasing goods or services, 
not for securing a cash loan, and since the financing did involve, in 
the words of the statute, an "instrument [the sales slip] evidencing 
the indebtedness of a buyer to the seller," "the credit card financing 
company could not be found to be in the business of making loans 
within the purview of the licensing statute. 
§7.2. Consumer credit: Refunds of interest and service charges. 
The Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act, enacted in 1958, 
gives the noncommercial purchaser a right to prepay his debt at any 
time and provides for a compulsory refund of unearned interest or 
finance charges upon such prepayment.1 Purchasers of other consumer 
goods on deferred payment plans were given similar rights by another 
statute in 1959,2 and consumers who pay for services rather than goods 
in this manner have had such rights since 1962.3 With customary dis-
regard for uniformity, the three statutes contain different descriptions 
of the method of computing the amount of the refund. 
In Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Commissioner of Banks,4 the Supreme 
Judicial Court was called upon to interpret the formula required to 
be used when the charges arise out of the retail installment sale of 
motor vehicles. Since the finance charges are much like interest, the 
statute provides that the earned portion may depend not only on 
elapsed time, but also on the amount of outstanding indebtedness 
during that time. It does this by providing that the refund shall be 
"at least as great a proportion of the finance charge [after deduction 
for an acquisition cost] ... as the sum of the periodic time balances 
after the day on which prepayment is made bears to the sum of all 
the periodic time balances under the schedule of instalments in the 
original contract."5 [Emphasis added.] 
If a contract requires regular payments on the last day of each 
§7.2. 1 G.L., c. 255B, §16. 
2 G.L., c. 255, §12b. Prior to 1959, these rights did not exist if the credit was un-
secured. 
3 G.L., c. 255, §12d. 
41965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 789, 207 N.E.2d 51, also noted in §§3.4 supra, 11.10 infra. 
5 G.L., c. 255B, §16. 
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month, and if the borrower should prepay the entire debt on such a 
day, then under this formula the numerator of the refund fraction 
must be the sum of the balances that would have existed for each 
subsequent month if prepayment had not been made. If prepayment 
is made during a month, after one regular payment day and before 
the next, the Court ruled that the numerator must still include the 
balance that would have existed at the end of that same month. In 
other words, the creditor earns no interest or finance charge for any 
part of a month if the debtor prepays at any time before the last day 
of the month, even the day before. 
The Court reached this conclusion by comparing the formula given 
with the formula provided when the debt arises from the sale of 
consumer goods other than motor vehicles. In that formula, the nu-
merator is "the sum of the periodical time balances after the month 
in which the debt is paid in full."6 [Emphasis added.] If prepayment 
is made on the last day of the month, both formulas give the same 
result. But for prepayments at any other time during a month, it is 
obvious that this formula gives the lender full credit for interest or 
finance charges for the entire month. Since the wording of the two 
statutes is different, the Court felt, with justification, that the results 
would have to be different. 
The refund provision for finance charges arising out of the render-
ing of services to consumers on time-payment plans is similar to that 
provided for the sale of consumer goods other than motor vehicles, 
except that it does not contain an additional sentence which is found 
immediately after the statement of the formula quoted above. That 
additional sentence is: "This computation of rebate to be made under 
the so-called sum of the digits method."7 The sum of the digits method 
is a simple method which involves numbering each installment, work-
ing backward from the last. If each installment is for an equal sum 
of money, then these numbers will be proportional to the balances 
due immediately before each installment is paid. Therefore, instead 
of adding the dollar amounts of the balances for each month, the 
numbers assigned to the months are added. When used in both the 
numerator and denominator of the fraction, this will give the same 
ratio although the additions are simpler. If the amounts of each install-
ment are not equal, however, then this method will give a slightly 
different result. It is rather ambiguous, therefore, when the statute 
sets out one formula and then states that computations are to be made 
by a different method, even though that other method will generally 
give the same answer. 
During the 1965 SURVEY year, several comprehensive retail install-
ment sales acts were proposed. In one, proposed by the Special Com-
mission on Laws Relative to Loans and Credit, the refund would be 
determined by counting the number of installments paid in advance 
6 G.L., c. 255. §12b. 
7 G.L .• c. 255, §12d. 
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and comparing that with the total number of installments.8 Under 
this method, not only would the creditor get no credit for any part 
of a month during which an installment is prepaid, but he would not 
even get greater credit for the earlier months, when the debt is high, 
than for the later ones, when the debt is low. This "straight line" 
method may be simple, but it is really indefensible in legitimate financ-
ing transactions. Prepayments in the later months of contracts which 
have run for several years would result in grossly exaggerated refunds 
of "unearned" interest or charges. 
In yet another proposal for a comprehensive act, reported by the 
Committee on Banks and Banking, the formula is spelled out, with 
the numerator to contain the sum of the balances which would have 
existed after the date of prepayment, but with a further clause stating, 
in substance, that prepayment during the first half of a month is to 
be deemed to have been made on the last day of the prior month, 
while prepayment on the second half of the month is to be deemed 
to have been made during the last day of the same month.9 This 
surely seems to be a sensible compromise between the extremes that 
result from the wording of the existing statutes. Regrettably, despite 
this laudable provision, the proposal does make the mistake of refer-
ring to the sum of the digits method after first spelling out the formula 
in terms of money balances due on each installment date. 
§7.3. Consumer credit: Collection costs. While it is unusual for 
the losing party in a suit to be required to pay the costs, including 
the attorney's fee, of the winning party, clauses in promissory notes 
requiring such payment if suit becomes necessary because of default 
are common. These clauses, if reasonable, are generally upheld as 
compatible with usury statutes, since the additional fee is considered 
an indemnity for additional expenses rather than interest.1 While 
such clauses have not been enforced when contained in notes taken 
under the Small Loan Act, the reason is that this act specifically pro-
hibits any verdict for more than would be required to discharge the 
indebtedness by payment.2 Provisions specifically allowing such pro-
visions are found in the Motor Vehicle Retail Instalment Sales Act,S 
as well as in the statute regulating loans secured by a security interest 
in consumer goods,' provided in both instances that these clauses are 
written in the appropriate agreements. 
In American Service and Supply Co. v. Raby,5 the trial court refused 
to grant the plaintiff's motion for allowance of counsel fees of 15 
8 House No. 3902 (1965). 
9 House No. 3901 (1965). For yet another statute with a provision substantially 
similar, see House No. 2069 (1965). 
§7.3. 1 See Leventhal v. Krinsky, 325 Mass. 336, 90 N.E.2d 545 (1950). 
2 G.L., c. 140, §90; Rockland-Atlas National Bank and Trust Co. v. Murphy, 329 
Mass. 755, no N.E.2d 638 (1953). 
8 G.L., c. 255B, §§9, 14. 
'G.L., c. 255B, §§9, 14. 
51965 Mass. Adv. Sh. 503, 206 N.E.2d 94. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1965 [1965], Art. 10
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1965/iss1/10
--------------- - -- - --
74 1965 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §7.4 
per cent, in accordance with the terms of the consumer note involved, 
on the ground that no evidence had been presented in support of the 
motion. The Supreme Judicial Court held, however, that in the ab-
sence of a contention that the fee amounted to a penalty, it should 
have been allowed. In the absence of statutory control, therefore, such 
fees seem permissible unless clearly unconscionable. 
§7.4. Sales: Medical services or goods. The implied warranties of 
quality recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code and the Uniform 
Sales Act alike arise only in contracts or agreements for the sale of 
goods. A sale is defined as the passing of title from the seller to the 
buyer for a price.1 With rare exceptions, courts consistently have main-
tained a distinction between a contract for the sale of goods and a 
contract for work and labor or for the performance of services, 
although the passage of title to property may be involved in both.2 
Thus, while a duty of care may be imposed on the selection of prop-
erty furnished under a contract for services, absolute liability under 
warranty concepts is not involved. The Uniform Commercial Code 
does provide expressly that, for the purpose of a warranty of mer-
chantability, the service of food or drink for value does constitute a 
sale, although it may not constitute a sale for any other purpose.3 
By stating this exception, the Code seems clearly to recognize the 
distinction. 
The passage of title to blood given in a blood transfusion has been 
held universally, in all reported decisions, to be merely incidental to 
a contract for the performance of services rather than a sale of goods.4 
Accordingly, liability vel non for the use of improper blood has al-
ways depended upon a duty other than that imposed by a warranty 
obligation. The legislature has now amended the Uniform Commer-
cial Code to make certain this result.5 Although it is difficult to dis-
cern the reason for the amendment in view of the consistent treatment 
of this type of situation by courts, reputedly the amendment was spon-
sored by the Massachusetts Medical Association because of fears raised 
by a pending case in the midwestern part of the country. 
The amendment itself is poorly worded, and parts of it are poorly 
placed in the Massachusetts version of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The amendment provides first that no implied warranty shall apply 
to a sale of "human blood, blood plasma or other human tissue or 
organs from a blood bank or reservoir." (The purpose of the "sale" 
is immaterial, since this is not limited to transfer of these things to 
patients.) It then apparently provides, in rather badly stated terms, 
that these things are not subject to sale for any other purposes of 
§7.4. 1 G.L., c. 106, §2-106(1). 
2Id. §2-314, delineating warranties of merchantability, and §2-315, delineating 
warranties of fitness, relate these warranties to the contract. Id. §2-106(1) limits 
"contracts" to those relating to a sale of goods. 
3Id. §2-314. 
4 See the leading case of Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 
N.E.2d 792 (1954); Annotation, 59 A.L.R.2d 768 (1958), and supplements. 
6 Acts of 1965, c. 297. 
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Article 2 of the Commercial Code, either. Just what this leaves, if the 
transfer is not for a transfusion or a transplant, is rather uncertain. 
It is a pity that the Commercial Code has been tampered with in 
such a sloppy manner. 
§7.5. Banks and banking: Conversion of co-operative banks. Con-
version of co-operative banks into federal savings and loan associations 
may be permitted provided that the Board of Bank Incorporation 
determines that public convenience and advantage will be promoted 
by such conversion.1 In Massachusetts Co-operative Bank League v. 
Board of Bank Incorporation2 the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the Board was justified in permitting conversion of a bank in 
Worcester over the objection of the Massachusetts Co-operative Bank 
League, although the bank was in no present financial danger, upon 
the showing of a demand for broadened services and greater oppor-
tunity for normal growth and in the absence of evidence of likely 
injury to the banking structure. 
In the making of its determination, the statutory guides which the 
Board had were stated in general terms only. Future applications for 
this type of conversion will not be quite so indefinite, and the stan-
dards to be applied by the Board will be much easier to follow, since 
the legislature this year has amended the statute permitting conver-
sion to provide full details of the contents of applications, clear restric-
tions on the types of evidence permissible at the hearings, and a list 
of factors for the Board to consider in making its determination.s 
The ultimate test is still the promotion of public convenience and 
advantage. While this amendment on the surface would seem to rep-
resent a tightening of requirements which must be met before con-
version will be authorized, it actually provides a blueprint which, if 
followed carefully, is more likely to assure the success of an appli-
cation. 
§7.6. Banks and banking: Payments to minors. Funds deposited 
in the name of a minor with anyone doing a banking business in this 
Commonwealth may be paid directly to the minor, unless in violation 
of written agreement.1 Now three specific types of banks-national 
banking associations, savings and loan associations, and federal credit 
unions-may also pay either parent of the minor if the amount of the 
deposit is not over $750.2 The reason for this amendment was not 
discernible by this writer. 
§7.7. Banks and banking: Unauthorized banking. The existing 
statute prohibiting unauthorized bankingl has been expanded in its 
§7.5. 1 G.L., c. 170, §49. Although this section had been suspended for two years, 
the suspension did not apply to applications filed prior to January 1, 1964. See Acts 
of 1964, c. 386, 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.l0. 
21964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1283,202 N.E.2d 598, also noted in §13.9 infra. 
S Acts of 1965, c. 430. 
§7.6. 1 G.L., c. 167, §48. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 197. 
§7.7. 1 G.L., c. 167, §12. 
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details, and in addition the use of the word "bankers" in the business 
name of anyone not authorized to conduct a banking business has 
been prohibited.2 The use of the words "bank" and "banking" has 
long been prohibited, but the word "bankers" has not. Any domestic 
corporation with this word in its title may continue to use the word 
provided that incorporation was prior to January 1, 1965. 
2 Acts of 1965, c. 154. 
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